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The strict construction approach is illustrated by Penn v. Standard Life and
Accidental Insurance Co.23 The policy provided for "loss of sight caused directly
and independently of all other causes, through external, accidental, and violent
means." The insured was not allowed to recover for loss of sight due to an eye
injury caused by accidentally falling from a train. The court said that the fall
merely hastened the loss which would probably have occurred eventually because
of a pre-existing cataract. The decision was that when disease or infirmity coop-
erated with accident, there could be no recovery.
In conclusion, it would seem the better theory that no distinction should be
made between accidental means and accidental result. Recovery should be allowed
under the terms of accident insurance policies when disease is not serious or viru-
lent. When a dormant abnormality and accident combine to produce death or dis-
ability, the death or disability is caused solely by accidental means. This was pre-
cisely the holding in the Lyons case, and therefore it represents what the law
should be in this field.
George C. Shelton Jr.
DOMESTIC RELATIONS: ESTOPPEL AND ITS APPLICATION TO AN INTERLOCU-
TORY DECREE OF DIVORCE
Where two parties have entered into a Mexican marriage and one of those
parties has obtained an interlocutory but not a final decree of divorce, can an
estoppel theory be employed to disable the other party from claiming the inva-
lidity of such marriage? In the case of Spellens v. Spellens' the California Supreme
Court answered this question in the affirmative.
In the Spellens case, plaintiff brought an action for a declaration that she was
the lawful wife of defendant and for a decree of separate maintenance. In the alter-
native if the court determined the marriage to be invalid, she asked for damages
for alleged fraudulent misrepresentations leading to the marriage ceremony and
for an award of quasi-community property of the parties.2 Plaintiff was an unhap-
pily maried woman. Defendant was a friend of the family who professed his love
for plaintiff and expressed a desire to marry her. He was a man of considerable
wealth and business acumen and represented to plaintiff that he also had wide legal
experience. He told plaintiff that he was aware of her circumstances and that if
she obtained a divorce he would marry her, provide for her children and make her
a partner in all his property. Plaintiff filed for divorce and obtained an interlocu-
tory decree, defendant having procured the attorney and paid his fees. Defendant
also told plaintiff that they could be married in Mexico and that the marriage
would be binding everywhere. They were married, but because of defendant's
cruelty the plaintiff brought the action. Plaintiff contended that defendant was
estopped to deny the validity of the Mexican marriage. Defendant maintained
that the marriage had no validity because plaintiff was not divorced at the time
she married defendant, and that an estoppel theory cannot be employed because
of the public policy of the state.
3
The trial court found, inter alia, that plaintiff relied on defendant's represen-
23 158 N.C. 29, 78 S.E. 99 (1911).
149 Cal. 2d 210, 317 P.2d 613 (1957).
2 1d. at 210, 317 P.2d at 613.
8Id. at 214, 317 P.2d at 617.
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tations; that he intended that she should rely on them; that plaintiff in good faith
married defendant, believing the marriage to be valid; and that defendant knew
he was not legally married and intended from the beginning that his marriage with
plaintiff be invalid.4 Nevertheless, the trial court did not estop defendant from
asserting the invalidity of the marriage.
The rule of estoppel in this type of case was stated in Rediker v. Rediker5
where the court said:6
[T~he validity of a divorce decree cannot be contested by a party who has procured
the decree or a party who has remarried in reliance thereon, or by one who has aided
another to procure the decree so that the latter will be free to remarry.
In this case defendant obtained a divorce in Cuba which was invalid because his
wife was never served with process. His later marriage to plaintiff was therefore
bigamous and void. The court denied him the right to assert this defense to plain-
tiff's action for separate maintenance.
In Harlan v. Harlan," plaintiff who was seeking to have his ceremonial mar-
riage with defendant annulled was also estopped to deny the final out-of-state
divorce decree. In the Harlan case the reasons for invoking estoppel were even
stronger, for there plaintiff assisted defendant in procuring her divorce.
In the Spellens case, both the District Court of Appeal and the California Su-
preme Court relied on these decisions, but each court, employing the same prece-
dents, reached a different result.
The District Court of Appeal, in deciding that estoppel could not be employed,
pointed out that the Rediker and Harlan cases presuppose the entry of a final
decree before estopping one of the parties from claiming the invalidity of the de-
cree.8 In both those cases a final decree was obtained out of state, but each was
invalid because of jurisdictional problems. In the Spellens case no such situations
existed. The appellate court stated 9 that the language in the cases regarding the
presupposiiton that the final decree must be entered before estoppel can be applied
... negates the argument that an estoppel may operate to create a marriage or the
right to future support where only an interlocutory decree has been obtained by one
of the parties.
The appellate court and the cases it relied on to support its decision refused to
extend the estoppel doctrine because of the policy consideration enunciated in the
California Civil Code, Section 61 (1), which states:
A subsequent marriage contracted by any person during the life of a former husband
or wife of such person, with any person other than such former husband or wife, is
illegal and void from the beginning, unless:
1. The former marriage has been annulled or dissolved. In no cae can a marriage
of either of the parties during the life of the other, be valid in this state, if contracted
within one year after the entry of an interlocutory decree in a proceeding for divorce.
(Emphasis added.)
In Parrann v. Parmann1 ° the court held that the equities of the situation
4 See D.CA. opinion 147 A.CA.. 348, 305 P.2d 628 (1957).
5 35 Cal. 2d 796, 221 P.2d 1 (1950).
6ld. at 805, 221 P.2d at 20.
7 70 Cal. App. 2d 657, 161 P.2d 490 (1945).
8 305 P.2d at 637 (1957).
9 Ibid.
1056 CaL App. 2d 67, 132 P.2d 851 (1942).
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could not be considered to work an estoppel for the reason that an inflexible rule
of law on the basis of this statute fixed the status of the parties. In Dominquez v.
Dominquez" the plaintiff through his own fault failed to obtain the final divorce
decree after the interlocutory decree was rendered. It was held that he was entitled
to have the ceremonial marriage annulled because to do otherwise would amount
to judicial legislation. The decisions rely on the phrase of the statute "in no case"
to establish the inflexible rule that a marriage entered into before the elapse of
one year after an interlocutory decree is a nullity.'
2
As mentioned previously, the Supreme Court also relied on the Rediker and
Harlan cases, but arrived at a contrary result. Namely that the estoppel theory
could be applied to disable defendant from claiming the invalidity of the Mexican
marriage. The court held that though these cases employ estoppel where a final
decree has been rendered invalid because of the lack of jurisdiction of the court
which purported to give it, there is no reason to limit the doctrine to merely analo-
gous fact situations. The policy should be extended to include situations where
there was a marriage within a year after the entry of the interlocutory decree.' 3
A failure to extend the policy would be a detriment rather than a benefit to the
public welfare and morals; it would invite people to attempt to circumvent the law
by living in an unlawful state, and then to allow these persons to apply to the
courts for relief when they wearied of the situation. 14 The Supreme Court in ex-
tending the estoppel theory overruled Parmann, Dominquez, and other similar
cases.
15
In recognizing a broadening of the policy considerations regarding divorce, the
court at the same time had to preserve the integrity of the code section from which
the policy stemmed. This preservation was accomplished by noting that it was not
that the marriage was found valid, but only that defendant by reason of his con-
duct was not permitted to question its validity or that of the divorce.1
The conduct of the plaintiff in the Spellens case was not unreasonable in that
the interlocutory decree declared that the parties were entitled to a divorce, and
it was not unreasonable for her, after putting faith and confidence in defendant,
to believe that the Mexican marriage would be valid. It would be difficult under
these circumstances which showed fraud on the part of defendant, "to imagine a
stronger case in this field of law."' 17 By enlarging the estoppel concept to apply to
circumstances similar to that in the Spellens case an equitable result was reached
and no violence was done to the policy considerations adhered to in this state.
William T. Sheehan, Jr.
11136 Cal. App. 2d 17, 288 P.2d 195 (1956).
12Rediker v. Rediker, 35 Cal. 2d 796, 221 P.2d 1 (1950); Dominquez v. Dominquez,
136 Cal. App. 2d 17, 288 P.2d 195 (1955) ; Parmann v. Parmann, 56 Cal. App. 2d 67, 132 P.2d
851 (1942).
1349 Cal. 2d at 216, 317 P.2d at 619.
14 Id. at 215, 317 P.2d at 618.
15 Sullivan v. Sullivan, 219 Cal. 734, 28 P.2d 914 (1934) ; In re Estate of Elliott, 165 Cal.
339, 132 Pac. 439 (1913).
16 See note 13 supra.
17 Ibid.
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